Turkiye’s Syria policy enters its most challenging phase

Turkiye was bound to the Syrian crisis by geography and history from its onset. Since the crisis began in 2011, Turkiye has been the staunchest supporter of the opposition against the Assad regime, offering both political and military backing. Due to its proximity to Syria and its extensive involvement in the crisis, it was not a surprise that Turkiye emerged as the primary base for the opposition-in-exile. The opposition established its first exile coalition in Turkiye and conducted its initial meetings there.

After Turkiye closed its embassy in Damascus, it hosted the first and second meetings of the Syrian National Council. Turkiye also played a crucial role in organizing the “Friends of Syria” meetings — a coalition of Arab and Western nations formed to support the Syrian opposition and facilitate the removal of Bashar Assad from power.

During my tenure as a diplomatic correspondent, I covered many of these meetings, including the significant one held in Marrakech, Morocco, in December 2012. This meeting marked the transformation of the council into a more inclusive coalition and saw the appointment of a new leader to represent the opposition. Despite being in the early stages of the crisis, it was evident there were deep divisions within the opposition. I could see this through the interviews I conducted with various Kurdish, Islamist and secular members of the opposition, which all had a different vision for Syria.

Ankara had developed a close and special relationship with the Syrian National Council, which was then the primary civilian coalition-in-exile seeking the overthrow of Assad, comprising members ideologically aligned with the Turkish government. However, Turkiye’s support extended beyond the council to include the opposition’s armed wing, the Free Syrian Army, which established its headquarters in Turkiye in October 2011.

Turkiye’s approach to the Syrian opposition must be understood from a broader perspective. In the long run, Turkiye’s effectiveness in empowering the opposition was hampered by rivalries among various coalitions both inside and outside Syria, as well as distrust between Islamist and secular members of the council. Expecting funding and political recognition from the international community, opposition figures and factions-in-exile competed for status and resources rather than uniting under a common banner. Now, many years later, Syria’s opposition still lacks a political leadership that could be effective against the Assad regime, which has been directly and indirectly empowered.

Fidan this month met with the main Syrian opposition groups in Ankara to discuss a political solution to the war

Sinem Cengiz

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan this month met with representatives of the main Syrian opposition groups in Ankara to discuss a political solution to the war. The leaders present included Hadi Al-Bahra of the Syrian National Council, Bader Jamous of the Syrian Negotiation Commission, which was established in 2016, and Abdurrahman Mustafa of the Syrian interim government. This meeting can be viewed in the context of potential talks over Turkish-Syrian normalization, with Ankara attempting to reassure Syrian opposition groups that it will not abandon them even if relations with Damascus are normalized. Turkiye still requires their support in the areas of Syria it controls, especially following recent unrest.

Fidan noted that Turkiye encourages dialogue between the government and the opposition, but it cannot force the opposition to do so. The opposition remains too weak for Turkiye to effectively present against Assad.

From the beginning, the opposition was highly fragmented, which not only undermined Turkiye’s policy of consolidating the opposition but also increasingly drew it into internal conflicts among Syrian groups. However, the failure of the opposition is not solely its own fault. Disagreements among regional backers of the opposition and rivalries among global actors supporting either the opposition or the regime contributed to this obvious failure.

Three key shortcomings have hampered the political opposition’s efforts to establish a significant and independent bloc that can be effective against the Assad regime: weak representation, overreliance on external actors and the declining significance of the political process. This has also diminished Syrians’ confidence in the opposition and lessened its appeal as a political representative.

Additionally, the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis have heavily impacted Turkiye. The number of refugees entering the country increased dramatically, amid direct security threats from terrorist groups that have found fertile ground in Syria. Consequently, Turkiye’s support for the opposition went hand-in-hand with its open-door policy for Syrians fleeing the conflict and cross-border operations in northern Syria to address security threats. Turkiye, therefore, utilized both hard and soft power in its Syria policy.

Turkiye’s potential normalization with Damascus raises concerns among both political and military opposition groups

Sinem Cengiz

Given its control over parts of northern Syria, Turkiye’s potential normalization with Damascus raises concerns among both political and military opposition groups that have fought alongside the Turkish army during its operations. Some groups have supported Turkiye’s push toward normalization with the Assad regime, while others have opposed it, maintaining an independent stance despite Turkiye’s influence over many opposition factions. This situation reveals divisions among various Syrian opposition factions regarding the Syria-Turkiye normalization process.

The existing divisions within Syrian armed factions and their varying levels of compliance with Turkiye’s directives also raise questions about Ankara’s ability to control these groups in the future, particularly if and when Turkiye and Syria normalize their relations.

Turkiye’s Syria policy has evolved through several phases over the past 13 years and it is now entering a new phase. Ankara is aiming to open a new chapter with Damascus while not abandoning the opposition it has supported for many years, resolving the refugee issue peacefully and maintaining security through its military control over northern Syria. No other country involved in the Syrian crisis has faced such a complex situation. This is, in fact, the hardest phase of Turkiye’s evolving Syria policy because it is totally alone in dealing with all of these related issues.

• Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz